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ABSTRACT
Recent strides in usability research have produced various 
solutions to assist computer users during interactions with IT 
security mechanisms. However, the usability concerns of users 
within organisations are not considered or simply not apparent to 
the one individual who can effect change, the IT security 
manager.  Ideally these concerns would resonate with the IT 
security manager, and here we explore how that can be realised, 
through the design of a password policy decision-support tool. 
During two 2-hour sessions, 3 IT security managers discussed 
with us our mock-up prototypes and a range of potential usage 
scenarios (e.g. cloud-based password-cracking attacks and “hot 
desking” initiatives). We find that the experience of the end-user 
is currently not appropriately represented within the IT security 
manager’s decision-making process, where the financial 
costs/benefits and business impacts of information security 
controls are foremost. Our tool design process elicits findings to 
help develop mechanisms to visualise these tradeoffs.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.1.2 [Models and Principles]: Human/Machine Systems – 
human factors, human information processing. C.2.0 [Computer 
Communication Networks] General –security and protection
General Terms
Management, Security, Human Factors.  
Keywords
Information security, usability, security policies, passwords  
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 10 years, there has been a significant body of 
research focussed on improving the usability of security 
mechanisms (e.g. [23], [24], [25].  
Some effort has been made to understand the nature of usability 
problems with existing authentication mechanisms, such as 
passwords - Adams & Sasse’s “Users are not the Enemy” [6] 
detailed how users were struggling with the number and 
complexity of passwords, and the impact of these problems on 
their productivity and attitudes to security. Since then, significant 
effort has been dedicated to providing alternative, more usable 
authentication mechanisms ranging from graphical authentication 
mechanisms (e.g. [27], [29], [30]), to video authentication (e.g. 
[31]), and to more unusual forms of authentication through 
brainwaves [32] and singing at the computer [33].  On the 
commercial side, there has been significant investment in 
biometrics to replace passwords with authentication via 
fingerprints.
However, most of this research effort and commercial investment 
has made little difference in practice.  In a recent study on 
password use in organisations [34] it was found that, 10 years 
after the “Users Are Not the Enemy” paper, little has changed: 
single sign-on is at best partially implemented, there are short 
timeouts on services leading to a need for frequent re-
authentication, and users are still required to generate complex 
passwords without regard to how it addresses the real threats.
It is often the case that enforced password changes interrupt users 
at inconvenient times; the user expends time and effort to 
generate and learn a new password and, if single sign-on is not 
implemented, it is likely that the user will be delayed while the 
new password is propagated [34].  
Even where single-sign on mechanisms exist, legacy systems and 
increasing use of 3rd party services mean that individual users still 
have a high number of passwords to cope with. The consequence 
of this reality is that users are forced to organise their primary 
tasks around the password mechanism. With the increase in e-
commerce, web-mail and other online services, users now have 
even more passwords in use than 10 years ago. Florencio & 
Herley [36] found that, considering only web-based services, the 
average user has an average 25 web accounts – since users cope 
by re-using passwords across several accounts, they have an 
average of 6.5 passwords each. 
Within organisations, interviews with security decision makers, 
conducted as part of the Trust Economics project [35] confirmed 
that the usability of security mechanisms, and any resulting 
impact on end-user productivity, is generally not considered when 
security policies are decided and security mechanisms chosen [7]. 
Cormac Herley [28] found that ignoring the costs to the user of 
complying with security advice is to “treat the user’s attention 
and effort as an unlimited resource. … Each piece of advice may 
carry benefit, but the burden is cumulative”.
Why is this so?  Are those in charge of security in organisations 
still ignorant about the impact that security measures have on 
individuals?  Do they know, but simply don’t care about the 
impact that security policies have on users? Our research with 
those who decide information security policies – generally 
referred to here as Chief Security Information Officers (CISOs) – 
has established that this is not necessarily the case. Rather, they 
do not know how to apply research findings on the usability and 
economic impact of security measures when making a decision 
about a specific security policy or measure.  
This led us to the notion of packaging and presenting knowledge 
of the impacts that security has upon users within a tool that 
CISOs can draw on during the security management decision-
making process, to make more informed choices about the 
security mechanisms they deploy within their organisations. 
CISOs need to justify policy decisions to senior managers and 
other stakeholders within the organisation and communicate their 
decisions in appropriate language. An example of a process 
modelling tool that provides an integrated treatment of usability 
and business process factors within information security 
management can be found in [10]. The modelling tool accounts 
for the risk mitigation achieved not only through a security 
policy, but also through consideration of usability and 
productivity. But the model is an abstract trade-off of investment 
and operating costs vs. risk mitigation achieved. To effectively 
support CISOs in their decision-making: 
! the model needs to be populated with data on the cost 
and benefit of specific security measures, and 
! there needs to be an interface that allows CISOs to 
explore the impact of security policies on their 
organisation, in an interactive fashion. 
In this paper, we describe a prototype tool that provides an 
integrated security, usability and economic perspective of 
information security policy management through the design of a 
graphical user interface (GUI) for use by CISOs. The tool exposes 
the human-behavioural and economic implications of observable, 
measurable information security policy decisions during policy 
review and management, while grounding information in terms 
that resonate with CISOs.  To ensure that the tool delivers these 
fundamental aspects, we arranged for a small group of CISOs to 
participate in a user-centred design process. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 
examines existing information security procedures and related 
work. Section 3 describes the methodology and notable results of 
our CISO consultations. Section 4 then details the design of the 
tool as applied to an example of password composition policy. 
Discussion of issues uncovered by the tool design follow in 
Section 5, with concluding remarks and thoughts on future work 
closing the paper in Section 6. 
2. BACKGROUND
A number of areas of research and commercial interest offer 
insights that are pertinent to the work described here. 
2.1 Usability and Compliance 
The impact of usability problems with security on individual and 
organisational productivity has been highlighted previously.  One 
of the first investigations into usability problems with passwords 
was prompted by the escalating cost of helpdesks for password 
resets [6], and established the number and complexity of 
password policies as a cause.  This early investigation also found 
that the difficulty users experienced reduced their willingness to 
comply - a finding confirmed in a more recent study [7]. 
In [7] a more formalised model was developed, linking the effort 
required to comply with security mechanisms to the level of 
compliance achieved. Herley [28] investigated the link between 
effort required to comply, and actual risk reduction achieved, and 
concluded that the fact that the decision taken by  most users - not 
follow security advice – is rational from an economic point of 
view, because the effort required to follow those rules is not 
worth expending for the risk reduction achieved. Ignoring the real 
cost of users’ attention and effort is a stance that does not work 
with external customers, and is even more untenable in a 
corporate context. 
2.2 Human Aspects of Information Security 
The use of checklists is generally no substitute for a thorough 
understanding of risk, as emphasised by the ISO 27001 standard 
[40]. Information security cannot be reduced to “box-ticking”, 
and in particular, must take into account perception of risks by 
organizational members and their security-related behaviour [21]. 
It has long been recognised that security policies cannot be seen 
as simply technical measures; to achieve their business objectives, 
they must consider the organizational, cultural, technological, and 
human elements as a dynamically interconnecting system [15]. 
Security mechanisms which fail to take into account the impact 
on the business processes or the users’ primary tasks are 
potentially unusable, and are likely to be circumvented by users, 
thus creating new vulnerabilities [21]. 
2.3 Usability of Security Interfaces 
Usability is also central to the interfaces used to manage security. 
Whitten & Tygar [41] found that interfaces for security 
implementations are unusable, even by highly computer-literate 
users (based on a case study of PGP 5.0). Security mechanisms 
are therefore either unused, or worse still, used incorrectly and so 
fail to provide the intended protection. 
If this is so for tools aimed at users in general, it is no less so for 
tools for security professionals. The importance of the usability of 
tools for security practitioners has been recognised, for example 
by [42], [12], [14]. However, perhaps because they focus more on 
policy implementers such as system administrators alongside 
policy-makers, this earlier research concentrates on those aspects 
– primarily technical – which are of concern to practitioners. 
Nohlberg & Backström [5] investigate delivery of information 
security policy information to an organisation’s upper-level 
management. The need to tailor pertinent decision-making 
information to intended users was considered, by way of 
interviews of potential users and scenario-driven design that 
contributed to a staged interface design. The nature of the 
intended users served to frame security from a financial and 
strategic perspective. We concentrate here on using interface 
design as a means to elicit CISO perspectives on the relationships 
between security, usability and economic factors. 
Our aim is to go beyond providing a tool to support the ways that 
security professionals work currently, to encourage them to take a 
more holistic approach, considering the user costs as well as the 
benefits of security policies. Our tool must be usable for the CISO 
if it is to equally improve usability from the point of view of the 
people who are expected to comply with security policies. 
2.4 Using Tools to Explore Options 
In describing our interface as a tool, we emphasise that a tool 
places the user and their task at the centre: “the tool itself seems to 
disappear” [26] - the objects of interest are displayed such that 
the user remains in the “high level” semantic domain. The CISO 
acts through the interface on the objects of interest [39].
Although in a very different application area, our tool draws on 
visualisation as a way to enable exploration in a way which is 
inspired by the Homefinder tool [11]. The interface, using sliders 
and graphical output, allows users to explore the impact of 
changing one or more parameters of their decision-making. 
Visualisation enables the exploration and understanding of 
complex interactions of variables [16]. As with other complex 
decision-making processes, humans are prone to conceptual or 
execution errors and to forgetting key items of information. 
Visualisation can help to avoid these classes of human error. In 
this case, the objects of interest are themselves relatively abstract 
concepts relating to parameters of security policy, so another 
design aim is that visualisation will help to concretise these 
concepts. 
Finally, visualisations also support communication [16] of tool 
output, which is important for CISOs looking for support from 
other senior managers. 
2.5 Modelling the Human Factor in 
Information Security within Organisations 
A number of modelling tools have been developed to support 
information security professionals to articulate policies within 
their organisations and foster a holistic decision-making approach 
in light of the increasingly strategic role of the CISO. 
An integrated approach to information security management 
incorporating human factors and economics principles has been 
demonstrated within previous research ([9], [10]), investigating 
the use of USB devices by employees. By characterising a user’s 
working locations and the security threats to data on a USB 
device, the authors determined that improper use of USB devices 
can result in a mixture of increased business flexibility and 
potentially costly breaches. 
Shay & Bertino [14] provide a simulation model for investigating 
trade-offs within technical and human factors of password policy 
for users. The model is framed by an end-user's perception of an 
IT environment, modelling their interactions with various services 
and associated user accounts. This allows the authors to 
characterise users’ attempts to memorise passwords for various 
accounts while they remain vigilant for signs of suspected attacks 
upon those accounts. Formalisation of password policy attributes 
and associated costs to the organisation – such as helpdesk 
support – expose the relationship between end-user password 
usage and the economic impacts of a particular password policy. 
This work exposed the need to balance security and usability for 
user passwords, for instance in terms of password character 
complexity. 
Beresnevichiene et al [17] augment the CISO's decision-making 
process with mathematical modelling tools. A structured process 
of problem elicitation leads to identification of a CISO’s policy 
preferences and utility, in terms of breach prevention, assurance, 
and business performance. This thereby characterises competing 
objectives, which in turn informs creation of a model to 
investigate policy trade-offs. These mathematical system models 
combine system equations to relate business processes, 
environmental factors and use of resources. A case study 
considers the activities of users in a scenario centred around use 
of SLA-assured services by third party employees, including 
associated support services. Modelling results identify that CISOs 
can achieve comparable security outcomes by balancing a 
multitude of security and process controls.  
The aim of the tool described in this paper is to encapsulate these 
research findings in a tool to support security decision-making. 
3. CONSULTATIONS
To effectively augment the task of deciding information security 
policies, we must first understand the CISO’s goals and tasks, and 
how these influence their decision-making. To develop this 
understanding, we consulted three information security managers. 
Two of these CISOs (who we will refer to as C1 and C2) have a 
wealth of experience working for large multi-national 
organisations in the financial sector. CISO C3 is in an information 
security management position at a leading UK university. 
Although this is a small group, the range of viewpoints 
represented provided us with sufficient insight into CISOs goals, 
tasks and decision-making for us to build a prototype interface. 
3.1 Methodology
We structured the CISO consultations so that we could relate the 
insights of individual CISOs across similar points of discussion, 
comparing responses to build a more detailed picture of the policy 
management process and how it may be enhanced by an 
appropriate policy management tool. The consultation process 
was conducted in two stages, as described here. 
Both stages centred on paper-printed versions of prototype tool 
screens created in drawing software [37] – mock-ups - of our 
proposed CISO interaction tool, which we printed out in large 
scale. We printed these in large scale and encouraged participants 
to interact with these mock-ups in describing how they might use 
our tool to investigate the implications of various information 
security events. 
3.1.1 Semi-structured requirements analysis 
This first stage constituted an informal walkthrough of a 
preliminary tool design. The interdependencies that we 
investigate in this work have rarely (if ever) been adequately 
exposed before in a form with which CISOs can make policy 
decisions. With that, choosing to approach CISOs with a tool 
design provided something tangible to discuss with the CISOs, 
around which they could articulate their thoughts. The tool design 
was inspired by the functionality of a process model being 
developed in tandem within the Trust Economics project [35].  
Within this initial consultation we also introduced some general 
decision-making scenarios within which CISOs could potentially 
use the tool, so as to identify appropriate functional boundaries 
and understand the environment that the tool could be used in. 
3.1.2 Scenario-driven design 
A second set of consultations with the same CISOs considered 
how a functioning instance of the tool would be applied. The 
initial meetings served to clarify how CISOs express the 
interdependencies that we consider in this work, and it was 
necessary to go further to examine how these interdependencies 
aligned with policy- and environment-specific attributes in well-
defined usage scenarios (e.g. maintenance costs of IT systems, 
ease of changing existing policies). 
At this stage, we focussed attention on the scenarios that were 
discussed with the CISOs. The intention was to expose 
interdependencies as they exist in practice, and examine how 
contributory factors may be formalised and quantified. Associated 
discussion facilitated investigation of how manipulating these 
factors could be seen to have both positive and negative impacts 
upon the functioning of the organisation in a given situation. This 
then provided insights into the effective exposure of these 
interdependencies to inform and augment existing CISO 
knowledge.
We structured pre- and in situ- prompts specific to each scenario, 
to (1) understand any existing thinking about the 
interdependencies, and (2) align exposure of the 
interdependencies within the tool with the policy decision-making 
process.
The scenarios we described to CISOs are specific to the 
management of password composition policies, and are included 
in Appendix A. A brief description and the purpose of each 
scenario are as follows: 
1. “Password Cracking in the Cloud” (e.g. [22]): “How do 
policy choices affect the organisation?” 
2. “Introduction of Hot-Desking”: “How do working 
practices affect security?” 
3. “Passwords vs. Fingerprints”: “How are business cases 
formulated and supported?” 
3.2 Analysis
The consultations with CISOs were voice- and video-recorded. 
The video recordings enabled us to capture interactions which 
CISOs were encouraged to make with the paper mockups. 
The voice recordings were transcribed and analysed using a 
variation on Grounded Theory [19]. Initial line-by-line coding 
produced 349 basic open codes. These were gathered around 21 
core codes; open codes and core codes were finally drawn 
together in groups of codes capturing thematic relationships. 
For example, we developed three code groups on themes of: 
“About the CISO”, “About Users”, and “About Passwords” (since 
our initial study took password policy as its object of focus). 
“About the CISO” contained codes such as “CISO is not [mainly] 
technical” – the position of the CISO in an organisation – and 
“what matters to the CISO”. “About Users” gathered codes which 
marked points in the consultations in which CISOs discussed our 
concept of classifying users into classes (see section 4.1). 
Our analysis produced the following findings which have 
implications for the design of the tool. 
3.2.1 The CISO’s Concern is to Support the Business 
Our CISOs were clear that their aim is not to impose security, but 
to support the business of the organisation. An important part of 
this role is in making arguments, or, more formally -business 
cases - for senior managers in an organisation. Senior decision-
makers are not interested in technical details, but in the business 
implications of security policies and the threats they aim to 
mitigate. The business case made by the CISO, therefore, draws 
on technical knowledge, but the essential point of interest is the 
financial implications of any security-related intervention. 
Security may in some cases have a low priority for the 
organisation [13], yet information security failures can cause 
stakeholders to question a company’s operations [38].  
Ideally, there would be evidence to support any proposed 
expense, presented in terms that both IT professionals and 
financial representatives would understand. Decisions would then 
be set in a broader context, and making security decision-making 
more inclusive. 
In reaching a decision on an aspect of security policy, a CISO will 
weigh up each possibility, not just in terms of security, but the 
overall business impact: C2, referring to password policies: “[the] 
CISO is also there to support the business. He wants to make it as 
easy as possible for the business to do its job. Make it easier for 
the users but increase the complexity. Need to present the options, 
and the business case, like you’re doing here”.
Our tool aims to encourage CISOs to new ways of thinking about 
security. CISOs are highly experienced; they are aware of 
benchmarks and can make decisions based on their experience or 
discussions with other information security professionals. 
Nevertheless, existing “best practice” can be questioned, 
particularly in terms of the balance of costs and benefits. Our tool 
provides a sound evidence base, and, by encouraging exploration, 
enables CISOs to review their decisions: C2, referring to policy 
decisions: “The journey is more important than the destination … 
you might actually change your mind.”
3.2.2 Trade-offs
Decisions-making invariably includes trade-offs between various 
costs and benefits. In the specific case of password policy, trade-
offs mentioned by our interviewees include: 
! If passwords are required are too long or too complex, 
this makes them more secure from cracking, but 
conversely might force users to write them down as the 
only reliable coping mechanism (this point is supported 
by [34]). 
! Users’ ability to recall passwords - and therefore, to be 
less likely to write them down - is related to the expiry 
time of a password; users must have a meaningful 
length of time to learn the password before expiry. 
Thus there are trade-offs between frequency of use, expiry time, 
password length, and complexity. Our interviewees spoke, for 
example, of increasing the length and complexity of passwords, 
but at the same time - to “give something back” to the password 
user - increasing the password expiry time. 
3.2.3 Risk Management 
Another clear finding from our interviews is that CISOs are 
engaged in risk management, rather than risk prevention at all 
costs (“it’s not the Crown Jewels”).
One participant argued that in consumer web applications, 
passwords are often used to protect low-value information - 
access to a newspaper or crossword. He said there are similar 
situations in commercial organisations – giving an example where 
he replaced password authentication to a company intranet with 
cookies on users’ machines. 
However, our interviewees were clear that for employees of an 
organisation, unlike the situation in e-commerce, different 
balances of costs and benefits apply in different contexts. There 
are cases in which a breach could lead to serious loss of 
reputation, or involve external legal or regulatory authorities, 
thereby incurring high costs for incident management. Moreover, 
in principle, employees can be required to conform to the 
organisation’s policies. Enforcement carries costs in terms of 
employee goodwill, however, and overly strong policies impact 
on productivity – for example, in time taken to reset passwords. 
Moreover, there is always uncertainty around the level of risk; in 
practice, it is never possible to identify the full implications of all 
security risks: C1: “That’s a Nirvana question. We will never be 
able to give an exact answer to “How secure are we? Do we need 
to be more secure?”. The best that can be attempted is to make 
reasonable estimates of key factors such as Annualised Loss 
Expectancy (ALE) [4]. 
3.2.4 Managing the Employees’ Security Practices 
A core aim of our tool is to ensure that an organisation’s security 
policies are usable from the point of view of those employees who 
are expected to conform to them. For this reason, the CISO’s view 
of organisation members and their security practices was of 
particular interest to us. 
As we detail in sections 4.1.2 and 4.3.2, the underlying process 
model incorporates the concept of user categories, which vary in 
terms of amounts of time spent working in different locations, 
with associated security risks. Participants were generally 
favourable to this concept, but expressed the need to be able to 
parameterise the numbers and types of user classes. We discussed 
with them other possible properties of users, beyond location, in 
particular the different levels of access to valuable assets. 
However, we concluded from responses by CISOs that it would 
be impractical to link users classes to assets at this level of 
granularity; besides, it is rarely easy to identify the cause of a 
breach: C2: “The difficulty is, any incident that causes … [a] 
large fine is impossible to attribute to a weakness in the password 
policy”. 
Yet different kinds of employee do have different levels of 
access: in a university, for example, C3, referring to the potential 
for loss of a university’s intellectual property, states: “The biggest 
risk is staff, because students have limited access, no access to 
finance. On the other hand, the likelihood is more”.
Employees also have differing levels of motivation and 
commitment to the organisation. Our participants were divided on 
the question of the impact of productivity losses resulting from 
difficulties in conforming to password policies. For one 
participant, this productivity loss is not a real cost to the 
organisation, since motivated employees will simply work longer, 
if necessary, or reorganise their time to accommodate the delay: 
C1: “[a retail call centre] might be concerned about productivity, 
…, but not knowledge workers, who will just add time to their 
day”.
Based on previous literature [15, 21] we argue that attempts to 
enforce secure behaviour in employees must be balanced against 
loss of employee time and goodwill. A key part of the CISO’s 
role is to encourage secure practices by all sectors of the 
workforce and promote a security culture. Enforcing unusable 
policies antagonises users and exhausts their willingness to 
comply, ultimately leading to rejection of security practices. We 
demonstrate through the tool that there is a balance between 
compliance management [7] and enforcement, and getting this 
balance wrong, paradoxically, reduces effective security. Our tool 
is a useful addition to the CISO’s armoury in achieving this 
balance.
3.2.5 Summary of Results from Prior CISO Sessions 
In supporting CISOs by illuminating possible trade-offs, helping 
them to manage risk, and supporting a security culture, our tool 
aims to support decision-making, rather than to be prescriptive. 
This is in keeping with the essentially exploratory nature of the 
underlying model; it is heuristic, not in the sense of “rule of 
thumb”, but in the stricter sense of being a technique for problem-
solving.
By providing an evidence base to support CISO decision-making, 
the wider aim, in our new paradigm, is to raise awareness of the 
costs as well as the benefits of security practices. Security 
requirements which are unusable incur hidden costs which are 
borne directly by the users and indirectly by the organisation. Our 
aim is to expose these costs and to show how they impact on the 
achievement of organisational goals. 
3.3 Requirements
Based on our consultations with CISOs and a review of related 
work, the following requirements have been identified as 
necessary to improve policy decision-making in information 
security management: 
! Expose Interdependencies: there is a need to represent 
the dependencies that exist between information 
security policies, human factors, and economic/business 
concerns: 
o Relationships between concepts must be 
captured in a more precise, quantitative 
manner to facilitate exposure of their 
interdependencies;
o The relationships between well-defined 
human factors, economic factors and 
information security metrics should be related 
to the remit of the CISO. 
! Exploit Familiarity: presentation of interdependent 
security, usability and economic expectations should be 
related to concerns that CISOs are familiar with. 
! Personalise Implications: Each organisation is unique. 
Potential implications of policy decisions should be 
made relevant to the individual organisation or they will 
not resonate with the CISO, who would in turn be 
unable to take suitably proportioned action.
! Augment Experience: any additional information for the 
purposes of decision-support should be presented to 
CISOs in a way that supports, but does not presume, the 
outcome of information security management decisions. 
CISOs should be encouraged to explore their policy 
options in a way that augments their existing wealth of 
knowledge.
! Provide Clarity: CISOs should only be presented with 
decision support technologies that they can readily 
understand.
! Empower Communication: CISOs should be able to 
generate evidence that can be communicated to other 
stakeholders (e.g. Human Resources, legal, IT) to gain 
support or facilitate negotiation of their proposed policy 
decisions.
The design of a policy composition tool should aim to address all 
of these requirements. 
4. DESIGN
To satisfy the requirements identified in Section 3.3 we designed 
the Password Policy Composition Tool (PPCT), a prototype tool 
focusing on the management of password composition policies as 
applied to end-users with centralised IT system accounts. It is 
envisaged that such a tool could be used by CISOs to support 
them as they make decisions regarding information security 
policies. This interface tool envisages an internal systems 
modelling process, analogous to that detailed in [10], that must be 
communicated to CISOs in an appropriate manner. It also builds 
on previous attempts to integrate security and human factors into 
the policy implementation decision-making process [2]. 
The PPCT allows CISOs to configure core aspects of a 
provisional password policy to their own requirements, and to 
observe the quantified consequences of the policy management 
decisions that they may potentially commit to. 
4.1 Password Policy Model 
If the PPCT is to be useful to CISOs, it must allow them to 
configure relevant aspects of password composition policy and 
provide an informative representation of the potential 
consequences, with which they can make more informed policy 
management decisions. 
The underlying model is built with the Gnosis modelling toolset 
[20][43], which aims to represent the security, usability and 
economic tradeoffs inherent in password composition policy, 
modelling policy implications projected over a fixed time-span. 
The behaviour of the model was informed by a combination of 
empirical data, existing literature, and expert knowledge. It is 
envisaged that such a model will operate within the PPCT, 
although for the purposes of our new paradigm, the actual 
implementation is not important. 
CISOs might not necessarily consider how to articulate and 
communicate these interdependencies, and so a tangible 
representation proved useful for focusing discussion during the 
requirements-gathering and design consultation stages (Section 
3).
4.1.1 Outline of the Password Usage Model 
It is anticipated that users within the model move between 
different working locations over a predefined period of time, 
accessing password authentication systems at intervals to gain 
access to the organisation’s IT systems and facilitate working 
with electronic information assets. Password authentication 
systems and the associated policy decisions are intended to limit a 
wide array of perceived information security threats within these 
various locations, instigated deliberately by malicious outsiders or 
colleagues. Interactions with the password authentication systems 
have the potential to secure or exacerbate access to IT systems. 
The organisation’s IT systems and the associated authentication 
mechanisms are regarded as a single, centralised entity for 
simplicity.  
The range of password-related security threats addressed in the 
model is limited to password cracking (e.g. dictionary, brute-
force) and guessing (“shoulder-surfing”, speculating). Whenever 
these threats manifest in the model, each instance may result in 
either of two distinct security breach events: 
! Complete Password Capture (results in an unanticipated 
and fully-exploited breach) 
! Partial Password Capture (where successive captures of 
the same password will eventually result in a Complete 
Capture, depending upon the attributes of the password 
policy) 
Whenever a modelled user authenticates to the centralised IT 
system, one of five types of password authentication outcome is 
realised: “Authenticated”; “Unauthenticated”; “Failed” (due to 
e.g. forgetting a complex password; “Resetting password”, or; 
“Locked out of account” (successive failed attempts). 
4.1.2 Parameters in the Model 
A limited (but representative) set of policy attributes and 
employee attributes are considered within the model. These 
properties are also exposed in the PPCT design: 
! Four password policy controls: 
o Mandated minimum password length 
o Mandated password character-set composition 
o Mandated password frequency of change 
o Period of notification for employees before 
mandated password change 
o Number of permitted authentication attempts 
before account lockout 
! Three (default) classes of employee using passwords to 
access organisation IT systems: 
o Executive: works mostly in the office, but also 
at home, with access to highly valuable 
information assets. 
o Road Warrior (i.e. consultant): typically in 
transit between locations, but also works in 
potentially insecure public places. 
o Office Worker: works only in an office 
environment, making up the majority of the 
organisation’s workforce. May be subject to 
attacks by industrial spies etc. 
! For each class of employee we represent 4 working
locations from which authentication systems can be
accessed (Office, Public, Home, In Transit).
The model informs IT security management decisions by
providing a simple representation of the balance between account 
breaches, end-user productivity loss and running costs (e.g.
salaried time lost to security administration activities such as 
resetting a locked account) resulting from enacted policies within 
the modelled threat environment. 
4.2 Overview of the PPCT Interface 
Configuration of any underlying password policy model should 
be obscured within the PPCT. Management of the model must not 
put undue expectations upon a CISO to interact directly with 
unfamiliar model technology and terminology. We herein 
examine the usability requirements of CISOs in terms of: 
! Communicating to a CISO a range of security,
productivity and economic factors and how they are 
interlinked.
! Supporting a CISO in making decisions about potential
password policies, using the configuration and output of 
the underlying model as evidence in decision-making. 
Consultations with CISOs encouraged the need to support CISOs
during the policy decision-making process, e.g. C1: “giving them 
a menu of things to tweak would actually prompt them thinking”,
C2: “the thinking of the CISO is going to be shaped by the
process of going through this”.
The Password Policy Composition Tool (PPCT) design exposes
policy-relevant details to CISOs, supporting exploration of the 
consequences of decisions within a limited view of information
security specific to password policy management. 
The PPCT is driven by configurable controls that correspond to
policy management decisions. In practice these controls would be 
linked to an executable model – or pre-populated table of model 
results – to give direct feedback on the security, productivity and
economic effectiveness of the tool over a projected period of 
deployment.
4.3 Configuration Properties 
Within the PPCT design three distinct and interdependent groups
of properties can be configured (as in the  lower portion
of Figure 1), each with their own separate tab in the configuration
section of the interface:
! (Security) Policy Properties: identifiable, quantified 
password policy controls (Section 4.3.1).
! User Properties: different classes of employees come 
into contact with an organisation’s IT systems within a
range of working locations as part of differing working
patterns. Configuring representative properties can help 
to generate results that inform how a prospective 
security policy would affect a real working environment 
(Section 4.3.2).
! Support Properties: these represent services within the 
organisation that support working patterns and policy
associated with use of password authentication systems
(Section 4.3.3). 
Figure 1. CISO Password Policy Composition Tool (PPCT) 
Interface (showing the “Policy Properties” view and
“Breaches” output)
Note that the “Policy Properties” are aspects of information
security policy that a CISO typically has the authority to change
(within reason). “User Properties” and “Support Properties” aren’t
necessarily under the control of the CISO, but are nonetheless 
characteristics of the organisation that can have an effect upon the 
security posture of the organisation.
Dividing related organisation properties into these distinct groups
provides a framework within which a CISO can understand the 
stakeholders affecting and affected by the security decisions they
make. By changing interface controls in each of these groups and
observing the results, a CISO can begin to relate observable 
changes in their provisional policies and the organisation around 
them to the security posture of the organisation’s IT 
infrastructure.
By presenting quantifiable values for the various controls and 
model outputs (Section 4.4), the PPCT promotes evidence-based 
information security policy decisions and accountability. The 
proposed ability to export model configuration parameters and
output results to an external file would facilitate the provision of 
supporting evidence when discussing potential decisions with 
other stakeholders in the organisation. That is not to exclude the 
possibility that many stakeholders including the CISO could
operate the interface directly at the same time in a workshop 
setting.
4.3.1 Policy properties 
CISO-defined “Policy Properties” may come in many forms (e.g. 
changes in variable controls, application or removal of “active or 
inactive” controls). Here we focus on quantifiable properties of 
information assets or security devices that can be varied across a 
discrete range of values, e.g. the “minimum password length” for 
end-user passwords across the organisation. 
The policy controls are presented as “sliders” (as seen in Figure
1). This simple mechanism promotes investigation of policy
measures across scales of increasing or decreasing security along 
different components of policy (e.g. “minimum password length”,
“password complexity”). This approach also encourages CISOs to
consider the manner in which policy effects changes based upon 
alterations to individual policy controls. Associating related
controls in the same panel also conveys that policy controls are at 
times co-dependent or may be altered in tandem to achieve 
varying effects. For instance, given a particular PPCT
configuration a user of the interface may find that a one-character
increase in “minimum password length” contributes more to the 
potential loss of end-user productivity than a 30-day decrease in
the “password change frequency”.
“Additional Information” accompanying each “Policy Property”
control (the round blue “i” icons) can be used to provide
information about the threats and vulnerabilities that each “Policy
Property” should be used to address. These hints can also indicate 
any specific guidelines or regulations that the control addresses 
(e.g. “ISO 11.3.1d”).
Additional information then serves to educate novice CISOs as to 
the situations within which to use a given policy control. It can 
also be used to structure the accountability process, highlighting
where a control applies to a specific industry mandate or 
recommendation (e.g. minimum required password length) Such 
information may be stored in an ontology (e.g. [1]), populated 
either by the industry or internally within individual organisation
using external tools (e.g. [2], [3]).
4.3.2 User properties 
The “User Properties” tab (Figure 2) facilitates definition of 
organisation properties that relate to a proportioned sample of the
different classes of end-user interacting with centralised 
authentication systems within an organisation. 
Some of the content described in Figure 2 is highly sensitive (e.g.
salary information). It is therefore important that the tool itself 
does not create a security vulnerability. As such the tool prompts
the CISO for relative “proxy” salaries for each user class, making
it unnecessary to retain sensitive information about actual salaries
(C2: “Have a sliding scale for salaries. Where you can get
accurate data, show it, otherwise indicate an approximation”). In 
turn such data may only be accessible by e.g. the organisation’s
human resources function. A similar approach of switching 
between absolute and relative numbers can be used where
appropriate to define the distribution of users within the modelled 
system.
Figure 2: The PPCT Interface “User Properties” view
Salaries may be “banded” relative to each other, to remove the 
need to disclose salary information. Definition of projected
earnings is optional, dependent upon the perceived value and 
working behaviour of individuals within a particular user class.
A CISO would not necessarily need to configure the User
Properties, and can rely on the calibrated default controls within 
the underlying model (which form a consensus view of a generic 
organisation as agreed by human factors, information security and 
systems modelling experts, C1: “if this is pre-populated with the 
average … this would be useful for CISO who’s not doing it as a
full-time role, who’s not got lots of experience”). However,
should the CISO want to see tool output that is more applicable to
their organisation, they are implicitly encouraged to gather
relevant information, likely by communicating with relevant
stakeholders in other departments. 
4.3.3 Support properties 
“Support Properties” (Figure 3) capture qualities of the 
organisation’s support services which, although external to the 
password policy, may nonetheless impact upon its effectiveness. 
These “Support Properties” are primarily related to the one-off 
and ongoing costs of IT security policy decisions. 
Specific to password policy, an organisation would ideally have
helpdesk facilities of some description to address those instances 
where end-users need to activate, reset or unlock
passwords/accounts. We make the simplifying assumption that 
there are helpdesk staff dedicated solely to answering password-
related requests from staff. From our CISO consultations, the cost 
of running a helpdesk largely employed on password resets is one 
of the major security expenses: C2; “In my experience, when 
we’ve tried to reduce costs, costs of running helpdesk is 
expensive”, and escalating helpdesk costs were the motivation for
the study conducted by Adams  & Sasse [6]. But, as Adams &
Sasse found, these costs result from aspects of password policy;
our tool will model these costs and expose them in ways that are 
clear to CISOs.
Figure 3: The PPCT Interface “Support Properties” view
Organisations are increasingly moving to the use of automated 
password resets, typically using pre-registered secret words;
where such systems are in place, password users are encouraged
to reset their passwords without the intervention of the staffed 
helpdesk. We model both automated and manual password resets, 
in proportions which can be adjusted by a slider on the interface. 
Grouping “Support Properties” in this way gives a CISO a sense
of how the infrastructure provisions within their organisation can
ensure or threaten the success of an IT security policy.
Conversely the CISO should appreciate that an effective security
policy does not overburden other functions within the 
organisation without good reason (or in this context, good 
business sense).
4.4 PPCT Output 
The tool presents the results of projected policy deployment as 
dictated by the controls described in Section 4.3. The output of 
the interface consists of: 
! Breaches: the number of breaches that would occur as a 
result of the policy being deployed over a period of a 
year (the upper portion of Figure 1). 
! Productivity: the total number of working hours lost
over the simulated year across all of the user types
defined as working within the organisation (Figure 4). 
! Costs: a breakdown of the support costs (e.g. helpdesk 
staff) and projected losses of salary and potential
earnings over the defined user classes (Figure 5).
The output of the tool is arranged in such a way that it allows a
CISO to “drill down” from high-level results to more granular
results (an approach encouraged by other investigations into IT
security management tools [8]). Where results pertain to user
behaviour, output data can be examined at a level specific to a 
particular user class. Varying levels of detail facilitate 
communication with other stakeholders according to levels of 
comprehension, but primarily support the CISO looking for
particular categories of evidence to support their decisions (C2:
“People have a gut feel and look for confirmation”).
Figure 4: The PPCT Interface “productivity” modelling 
output
Figure 5: The PPCT Interface “costs” modelling output 
The manner in which output is presented in the PPCT also 
promotes exploration of the “decision space”. The top-level is an 
integrated treatment of breaches, productivity and costs,
represented as a 3D plane. It is envisaged that a CISO would be 
able to examine output datasets across this plane to support 
speculative policy decision-making. 
The consulted CISOs all suggested that the tool could be used to 
support a business case, wherein the tool’s output is used to 
justify expenditure for further security programmes. 
The intuitive correlation of the quantified properties of a 
provisional policy (properties represented in the control panels) to 
the quantifiable and identifiable consequences of that same policy 
(the tool output) promotes an approach of proportional security, 
and of articulating the effects of policy decisions (C3: “I am only 
gut feel. I am only one person.”). The effects of those decisions 
are communicated to a CISO with even sharper clarity with the 
facility to personalise many of the PPCT controls to a specific 
organisation, encouraging individual CISOs to understand the 
organisation around them not just in terms of security, but also 
usability and economic impacts (C1: “Want a starter for 10, 
based on somebody’s view, that can be tweaked. - naive vs. 
sophisticated user”). 
5. DISCUSSION
There are aspects of the tool design and the design process that 
warrant further discussion. 
In the previous section we detailed the functionality and 
interfaces of our proposed tool. In section 3 we described the 
results of consultations which we undertook, using scenarios and 
paper prototypes of our proposed tool. Here we present 
implications of these findings for the design of the tool. 
5.1 Tool Design 
Broadly, the participating CISOs were very much in agreement 
that the functionality of the tool was adequate to expose the 
interdependencies between security provision, end-user 
capabilities, and the enablement of business processes. We do 
however accept that this was a small group of CISOs, and are 
open to reporting extensions or revisions to the tool and 
associated model both for and from further CISO consultations. 
In particular all three CISOs were interested in the potential of the 
tool to make a business case – which they expressed as a major 
requirement (recall section 3.2.1). However, there were different 
approaches to decision-making, ranging from focused to more 
serendipitous. Our participants differed in how open they were to 
revising their initial decision in response to insights gained 
through exploration of the tool. 
The finding that linking user classes directly to assets (section 
3.2.4) is one example of a more general concern with an 
appropriate level of granularity. Participants particularly liked our 
suggestion (section 4.4) of enabling a CISO to “drill down” into 
the results, as a way of catering for different granularity 
requirements. Participants made a number of specific suggestions 
about how the interface could handle both data which is known 
with a high degree of accuracy and other input data known only in 
gross terms. For example, sliders, perhaps measuring simply 
percentiles, could be used to register approximate values, or 
actual numbers could be used where these are available. 
5.2 Stakeholders
The representation of policy and environment attributes is key to 
the success of the tool in facilitating communication with other 
stakeholders in the organisation. The tool is designed so as to 
formally represent and relate these attributes, which serves to 
remove ambiguity. This may prove useful when presenting a case 
for IT security investment (C3: “Often pitching to finance officer. 
IT often comes under finance … you’ve got to show what the risk 
is financially, to be taken seriously. In financial terms”, C2: 
“Need to present the options, and the business case, like you’re 
doing here.”).
CISOs must communicate policies to other stakeholders 
(including department managers and employees) to achieve 
actionable security measures. It is also necessary to relay policies 
to external auditors, regulators and perhaps even shareholders. 
Thus, a CISO needs to be able to communicate both with 
technical implementers and with budget-holders and other 
decision-makers who do not understand the technical language of 
IT and security [38].
There may be a need to approach these other stakeholders within 
the design process to assess their expectations of security. For 
instance, potential breaches may result in per-event or per-record 
breach conditions which legal representatives would need to 
evaluate, as well as costs incurred for investigating particular 
kinds of breaches (C1: “impact is not only value, also loss of 
reputation, legal impact, regulatory impact. E.g. could lose 
licence”, C3: “Cost of breach can go through the roof, because of 
cost of accountants etc.”). Our tool does not as yet model 
breaches with this level of granularity, as the “complete picture” 
of breach costs is informed by many parties, not just CISOs.  
5.3 Decision-making Process 
The tool design, and indeed the underlying model, may implicitly 
incorporate assumptions about how CISOs actually make policy 
decisions. Appropriate decision-making strategies should be 
supported, and doing so should also limit the cognitive effort 
required by users of the tool to analyse complex information [18]. 
In this sense our consultations identified factors in the CISO’s 
decision-making process which we made efforts to support rather 
than supplant.
The output of the tool may be more useful if exposed in different 
ways, depending upon the background of the user. For instance 
breach results displayed over the projected lifetime of the policy 
would allow CISOs to identify temporal trends in user or system 
behaviour which are likely to impact upon the effectiveness of the 
organisation depending on when they are expected to occur. 
Exposing characteristics of the output throughout the model 
lifetime would add to the ability to “drill down” into the output to 
reveal further levels of detail. 
5.4 Organisational Culture 
We make no assumptions in the design of the tool about the 
working culture of the organisation that a CISO works in. For 
instance we do not consider application to specific industries (C1: 
“utilities … not a lot of data worth stealing … so unlikely to steal 
password to get data, contrast with investment banking [where] 
risk of malicious tampering with data is lower”). However, this 
could potentially be exposed through further analysis of the utility 
of security mechanisms, as embodied by a CISO’s preferences for 
security, productivity or cost information.  
The balance between the benefits (in terms of breaches avoided), 
support costs, and productivity losses, arising from security policy 
decisions, is made, in our underlying model, towards the end of 
the mathematical process, at which point the output from the 
model is applied to a utility function – see [10] for an explanation 
of how this is implemented in a similar model. The culture of the 
organisation – such as its risk aversion, the value of its assets, and 
the appetite for expenditure on security – could be reflected in our 
tool by adjusting coefficients of the utility function. We note this 
here as a possible future refinement for a working version of the 
tool.
The tool and the underlying model also make no assumptions 
about how people react to security mechanisms. For instance: C1:
“in banking people are motivated. Password might irritate people 
but won’t cost people”; C3: “the more complex the passwords, 
the more people write them down. So there’s a balancing act”;
C3: “engineers, keen on IT, they do workarounds”.
Also, for simplicity we assume that if a user is e.g. locked out of 
their IT system account due to a failed login, they are unable to do 
any work until the account is reinstated. This leads to discussion 
of the reliance on IT systems, and the technical capabilities and 
respect for policy according to end-users (as further discussed in 
[7]). 
5.5 Instrumentation
Many of the parameters in the tool assume that the organisation’s 
infrastructure has been instrumented to provide the necessary 
values (e.g. helpdesk call duration, etc.). However at present the 
activities of end-users and security mechanisms as represented by 
the tool are represented by a mixture of CISO opinion and 
unexposed model constants, and do not facilitate the submission 
of real monitoring data from relevant sources within the 
organisation. This is beyond the remit of this paper. 
5.6 How the Tool might be used in Small and 
Large Organisations 
While CISOs have rapidly become part of senior management of 
most large organisations, in small and medium-sized enterprises 
there are no dedicated positions for an information security 
specialist. For such organisations, the tool might be a repository 
of evidence which can partially overcome the lack of specialist 
skills. Conversely, larger organisations, with a dedicated CISO, 
might use the tool as a base which could be parameterised to 
reflect their actual situation. 
Even in large organisations, it is unlikely to be possible to obtain 
accurate figures for all of the parameters in the model. However, 
this does not necessarily detract from its usefulness, since some 
parameters are likely to be insignificant in practice, while others - 
restricted data such as the costs per hour of different user classes, 
for example - can be expressed as gross figures in relative, rather 
than absolute, terms. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) and other IT security 
managers are usually not aware of the effects that their security 
policies might have on the abilities of end-users within the 
organization to use IT mechanisms effectively. These security 
managers must cultivate an awareness of how end-user usability 
enters into the interdependencies between security provision, end-
user usability and economic requirements within their 
organisation. We investigate the capacity to actively inform 
CISOs of these factors during IT security policy composition, by 
way of a prototype Password Policy Composition Tool (PPCT) 
user interface.  
This tool facilitates exploration of changes to quantified password 
construction policy mandates, supporting services and end-user 
capabilities, providing feedback as to the impacts of these 
changes upon each other and the organisation as a whole. The 
usability of the tool is also considered, as it must support 
exploration of policy choices, provide clarity, and facilitate 
communication with stakeholders within the organisation.
Discussion and qualitative evaluation of the tool design by 
consulted CISOs demonstrate that it intuitively conveys elements 
of end-user usability, security and economic concerns within the 
information security policy decision-making process. 
We intend to consult with additional CISOs to progress an 
implemented version of the tool. Any resultant implementation of 
the tool could be repackaged to cover not only password policy, 
but other aspects of information security with human and 
economic factors, such as endpoint and information asset 
protection policies. 
It may also be conceivable to change the focus of the tool from 
CISO-oriented policy composition towards guiding end-users 
during password creation, thereby shifting the emphasis of the 
tool to security awareness and education. 
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Appendix A 
A1. Scenario 1: Password Cracking in the 
Cloud
“A senior manager of your organisation has come to you having 
read an article claiming that password cracking attempts can be 
run within “cloud” computing environments, making it easier to 
find the financial and computational resources to brute-force 
attack a password. 
The senior manager does not trust the precautions you have taken 
to protect the central password tables or passwords in transit 
between user workstations and the authentication systems. The 
senior manager then demands that you take action to strengthen 
the organisation’s employee account passwords from the threat of 
exposure through this “cloud cracking” method (with the 
assumption that such an attack can be tailored to target enterprise 
authentication systems). 
From reading the article, you believe that in order to keep 
passwords safe from cracking using the “cloud” (at least for the 
foreseeable future), there are three password options available to 
protect your organisation from such an attack. 
! If mandated passwords contain both lower-case letters 
and numerical characters, maintain a minimum 
mandated password length of 12 characters. 
! If mandated passwords contain lower-case letters, 
upper-case letters and numerical characters, maintain a 
minimum mandated password length of 11 characters. 
! If mandated passwords contain lower-case letters, 
upper-case letters, numerical characters and special 
characters, maintain a minimum mandated password 
length of 10 characters. 
Your organisation currently mandates 8-character passwords 
consisting of lower-case letters and numerical characters, so any 
one of these suggested mitigations represents a potentially 
disruptive increase in security effort for staff. 
Further information associated with the original article suggests 
that using cloud technologies, an 8-character password consisting 
of lower-case letters, upper-case letters and numerical characters 
may be cracked within 100 days. With this you may also wish to 
explore your options for the frequency with which staff have to 
change the passwords they use to access accounts on your 
organisation’s IT systems. 
You must investigate the options available to you, while 
considering the effects upon staff productivity and supporting 
costs of increasing the effort they must expend to maintain the 
level of security you believe is appropriate.” 
A2. Scenario 2: Effects of a Hot-Desking 
Policy on Password Policy 
“The lease on your organisation’s HQ in Central London is 
coming to an end, and the leaseholder wants to significantly 
increase the rent.  This has prompted your CEO to hire a Space 
Utilisation Consultancy to assess how well the available space is 
used. The consultancy’s report states that on average 37% of 
desks are not occupied during the hours of 9am-5pm. 
Your CEO has calculated that your company can give up 3 of its 
6 floors, saving the company £1.5 Million in rent p.a., and is 
determined that the company should achieve this through “hot 
desking” and by abolishing all meeting rooms (except for the 
board room).  At the moment, the company has a traditional 
perimeter security, with no remote access to systems, except for 
sales staff, who are able to enter their sales into the company’s 
systems from home via a dedicated web service.  A review 
conducted by the head of departments in HQ reveals that to 
achieve this, the company has to make the following changes: 
! All sales staff (20) will no longer have any desk space 
in HQ.  They will now exclusively work from home or 
access systems on-the-road.  Apart from entering 
orders, this involves access to inventory and price 
information, quotations, customer databases. 
! 75 employees who previously only could access 
systems from within HQ will now have to hot-desk and 
work from home.  For informal meetings and/or when 
they need to be close to the office but no desks are 
available, they will have to use coffee shops close to 
HQ, using remote access systems.  They will now have 
to share computers, instead of each having their own. 
30% of the previously office-bound staff have said that 
they will not be able to work from home and so they 
will have to use coffee shops or other public places near 
to their home or the office. 
! The 5 board members will have to book space in 
meeting rooms for formal meetings in commercial 
centre, and access systems remotely to present relevant 
information.
Major stakeholders have been given a limited amount time to 
lodge any objections to the “hot desking” initiative. You are in a 
prime position to inform the CEO of any serious security 
implications that this initiative may introduce. As such you should 
be able to explore the security implications of these new working 
conditions and report to the CEO any findings that you think may 
influence their final decision.” 
A3. Scenario 3: “Password Authentication vs. 
Fingerprint Readers” 
“A new fingerprint-reading technology has become available that 
is cheaper to purchase than previous incarnations. It may be 
worthwhile investigating the possibility of replacing your 
organisation’s password authentication systems with this new 
biometric-based authentication system. 
The cost of each fingerprint reader is still being negotiated, so you 
do not need to consider it in the model. The manufacturers have 
also mentioned the possibility of being able to negotiate discounts 
if the central fingerprinting system and associated employee 
fingerprint readers are bought in bulk for use across your entire 
organisation.
However, there are a number of issues to consider in deciding 
whether to purchase a completely new fingerprint authentication 
system for your organisation: 
! There would be no requirement for staff to recall a 
password when authenticating to the IT systems. This 
might result in fewer helpdesk calls. 
! Systems staff will have to visit every desktop computer 
in the organisation to install the fingerprint readers and 
associated software. You plan to do this on a rolling 
programme over 6 months. There are 2000 desktop 
computers in your organisation; assuming 2 staff people 
work weekends, each could do 5 per hour or 35 per day, 
70 per weekend, equivalent to work spanning 28 
weekends. 
! All employees will have to enrol their fingerprints with 
the system. Existing staff will do this on the first 
working day following installation of a reader on their 
desktop computer. New staff will enrol on their first day 
of employment. This can usually be done by the 
employees on their own, but you expect that 25% of 
them will have problems doing this, requiring a visit 
from a member of the helpdesk staff. 
! The fingerprint readers you are considering have a 
typical false negative rate of around 5%, and a failure 
rate of 10% per year, related to how accurately people 
were enrolled initially. This is analogous to the problem 
of users re-typing or forgetting their account password. 
If a password reader has failed and a member of staff 
cannot authenticate, that would require intervention by 
support staff to resolve any such issues. However, with 
fingerprint readers, all such faults are likely to require 
physical intervention by support staff, resulting in 
longer fault resolution times. There are then typical 
support costs and procedures associated with 
biometrics, just as there are for password authentication 
systems (in the form of automated or manned 
helpdesks).
! Fingerprint readers can suffer from false positives, 
where an operator of a fingerprint reader may be 
authenticated as someone else; these readers have a 
typical rate of around 1%. However, a targeted attack, 
for example using a silicone copy of a genuine 
fingerprint, could have a success rate of 5%. This is 
analogous to the threat of passwords being guessed, in 
that the authentication system believes the operator and 
the owner of the authenticated identity are one and the 
same (much like when someone else knows the 
“something you know” that constitutes a user’s 
password).
! Employees with no one fixed working location will 
have to guarantee that any portable fingerprint readers 
they use (for instance as found in some makes of laptop) 
function correctly outside of the organisation’s 
premises. Faults in authentication systems for 
biometrics have much greater implications than 
problems of passwords being forgotten. However the 
security benefits of using biometric authentication in 
public places over password authentication are obvious. 
It is your responsibility to investigate whether your organisation 
should introduce a completely new fingerprint authentication 
system for all employees’ IT accounts, replacing the existing 
password authentication system. 
As part of this investigation it is worthwhile to consider whether 
the existing password authentication policy can be altered to give 
comparable security, productivity and cost advantages to those 
offered by the fingerprint system.” 
